A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error by Roland Kirstein & Georg v. Wangenheim
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 







Roland Kirstein and Georg v. Wangenheim 
 
 
A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with 


















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 







Göttingen  MAGKS A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with
Two Independent Probabilities of Error
Roland Kirstein ∗ Georg v. Wangenheim ∗∗
March 12, 2010
Abstract
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assump-
tion that jury members only commit one type of error. If the prob-
ability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are bet-
ter than those of individual members. In binary decision situations,
however, two types of error may occur, the probabilities of which are
independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a general-
ization of the theorem. Under this generalization, situations exists in
which the probability of error is greater than 0.5 but the jury decision
generates a higher expected welfare than an individual decision. Con-
versely, even if the probability of error is lower than 0.5 it is possible
that individual decisions are superior.
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21 Introduction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (henceforth: CJT) states the conditions un-
der which a jury that decides with absolute majority is less likely to commit
an error than each single member.1 Under two further implicit assumptions
(namely: correct decisions are eﬃcient and the group decides without orga-
nizational costs) the CJT thus states the condition under which the group
decision increases expected welfare, compared to the individual decision.
In this paper, we maintain the assumptions that correct decisions are
beneﬁcial and groups decide with absolute majority and without cost. We
take a closer look at the fact that the CJT focuses on binary decisions.2 Such
decision situations are governed by two types of errors. E.g., if the decision is
among a legislative initiative and the status quo, the new law may improve
or deteriorate welfare. Thus, the decision for it can be welfare decreasing
(one type of error) or maintaining the status quo may result in a foregone
welfare gain (second type of error). The probabilities with which these two
types of errors are committed are independent from each other. Condorcet
himself notes (1785: 12 and several times later) that errors of the two types
may involve diﬀerent costs and thus deserve diﬀerent quorums for decisions
which may involve the more expensive error. However he does not discuss
the case of diﬀerent error probabilities for the two types of error. It is the
aim of this paper to derive a modiﬁed CJT under the assumption that the
probabilities of two types of errors are independent from each other.
The CJT makes three statements: If the probability of an individual jury
member to decide correctly is greater than 0.5, then 1. the group decides cor-
rectly with a higher probability than an individual member; 2. increasing the
group size increases the probability of its correct decision; 3. this probability
goes towards one if the group size goes towards inﬁnity. Taking into account
two independent error-probabilities, we can prove corresponding results for
these three claims.
With two probabilities of errors, the comparison of the decision quality of
1For an overview of Condorcet’s contributions to mathematical economics see
Cr´ epel/Rieucau (2005) and Rothschild (2005). Many real-world examples can be found in
Surowiecki (2004) who, however, fails to even mention the name Condorcet.
2The case of more than two options has been analyzed by List/Goodin (2001).
3two juries of diﬀerent size is not as trivial as in the simpliﬁed case covered
by the CJT. The ﬁrst step of our analysis is, thus, the determination of the
expected welfare generated by a jury that consist of homogeneous members
who decide with absolute majority. Using expected welfare as a criterion
for decision quality, we derive our results on the relation between jury size
and expected welfare. Our results show that the CJT is a special case of
our generalized jury theorem, as the CJT assumes two equal probabilities
of error. Under this assumption, our model reproduces all the results of the
original CJT. However, many combinations of error probabilities exist under
which the claims made by the original CJT had to be modiﬁed.
The CJT has been used in Schoﬁeld (2002), (2005) and Congleton (2005)
to evaluate the merits of representative democracy. Another possible area
of application is public choice, e.g., the analysis of federalism in Mueller
(2001). In business administration, the CJT may prove useful to analyze
hierarchies.3 Another application to organizational theory has been provided
by Ladha (1992), while Berg/Mara˜ non (2001) and Koh (2005) have analyzed
hierarchies.
Moreover, the CJT may help to theoretically determine the decision qual-
ity of collegial courts compared to that of single judges. An empirical study
by Karotkin (1994) has demonstrated that chambers composed of three
judges do not come to better judgements in private law cases. In penal
law cases, however, the opposite is true.4 The CJT may provide valuable
insights for the design of court systems.5 Society wishes courts to avoid er-
rors. If the theorem is true, then society faces a trade-oﬀ between decision
quality (demanding larger chambers or juries) and the cost of running the
court system, as collegial courts are more cost-intensive. Moreover, the dura-
tion of a court case might be increased if more judges are involved, as Tullock
3Boland (1989) examines whether it is better to split a jury of, say, nine members
into three sub-committees, let each of these sub-committees vote on the issue, and then
aggregate the three votes to one decision. In his model, an indirect majority system does
not improve the quality of a group decision.
4The criterion for decision quality was the rejection rate in appeal courts.
5In 1970, the US Supreme Court ruled that state juries need not consist of twelve mem-
bers (No. 399-U.S. 78, Williams vs. Florida). This decision has provoked research activi-
ties regarding the impact of jury size on the probability of conviction; see Gelfand/Solomon
(1973).
4(1994) has argued. Juries of peers are also costly, as ordinary citizens may
face enormous opportunity costs when serving in a jury. These cost aspects
are assumed away in the CJT.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy repeats
the CJT, which mainly serves to introduce our notation.
In section 3.1 we introduce a theory of imperfect binary decision making.
This theory highlights decision situations in which the choice between two
options A and B is inﬂuenced by the probability of two types of errors. It
serves well to model decisions by experts, i.e., decision-makers whose prob-
abilities of error are smaller than those of ordinary people. The analysis in
section 3.1 presents conditions under which it is better for society to blindly
carry out one of the two options, and when it is beneﬁcial to ask an expert.
Our ultimate goal is to derive the condition under which it is better to
appoint a jury (consisting of homogeneous experts who decide with majority)
rather than a single expert or a decision based solely on the prior information.
As the single expert can be perceived as a jury of size one, the next step of
our analysis derives the conditions under which it is beneﬁcial to appoint a
larger jury, based on expected payoﬀs from the decision. This analysis allows
us to derive the modiﬁed jury theorem in Section 4. In Section 5 we extend
the modiﬁed theorem to the comparison with the decison based soleley on
the prior information. In Section 6 we brieﬂy discuss the derived insights.
2 The Condorcet Jury Theorem
Assume that a decision body is composed of an odd number of members (k =
2h+1 with h ∈ I N
+), and that each of these members decides independently
of the others. The collective decision is made with absolute majority, while
abstention is neglected and prior communication is excluded.6 Moreover, the
jury members are assumed to be homogeneous: each comes to the correct
6Juries with members who do not decide independently of each other are ana-
lyzed by Berg (1993) and Ladha (1995). The qualiﬁed majority rule was analyzed by
Nitzan/Paroush (1984) and Ben-Yasar/Nitzan (1997). The reliability of jury decisions
under alternative majority rules has been compared by Klausner/Pollak (2001). Fedder-
sen/Pesendorfer (1998) have asked whether the decision quality of a jury increases if it
switches from a majority to an unanimity rule.
5decision with probability q ∈ [0,1].7 Finally it is assumed that the members
do not face incentive problems when making their decisions.8
Let Q(j,q) denote the probability that j members come to the correct















We will later make use of the following lemma:9
Lemma 1 For all h ∈ I N
+ and k = 2h + 1:
1. Qk(0) = 0 and Qk(1) = 1,
2. Qk(q) is symmetric in the sense that Qk(1 − q) = 1 − Qk(q), which














qh−1(1 − q)h−1(1 − 2q), which implies that Qk(q) is
s-shaped.




qh+1 (1 − q)
h+1 is positive














has the opposite sign of ∆k+2(q) and
is thus negative (positive) for all q ∈ (1/2,1) (q ∈ (0,1/2)).
Figure 1 exempliﬁes the shape of Qk(q) for k = 3,7,15,99. The higher k,
the greater the curvature of Qk(q). Using this Lemma, the main claim of the
CJT is easy to be proven.
7For larger juries, however, this assumption is hardly satisﬁed; Berg (1996, 231) de-
rives results for heterogeneous juries; see also Paroush (1998), Berend/Paroush (1998),
Berend/Sapir (2007).
8Strategic voting is analyzed in Feddersen/Pesendorfer (1998).
9The proof of Lemma 1 is found in Appendix A.
6Qk(q)
q
Figure 1: Shape of Qk(q) for k = 3,7,15,99
Theorem 1 (Condorcet Jury Theorem) Consider a jury that consists
of k = 2h+1 members, each of whom decide correctly with probability q. The
jury decides with absolute majority. For all h ∈ I N
+, and for all q ∈ (1/2,1):
a. Qk(q) > q
b. Qk+2(q) > Qk(q)
c. limk→∞ Qk(q) = 1.
Proof: We ﬁrst note that for k = 3 we have: Qk(q) = q3 + 3q2(1 − q) =
q(1 + (2q − 1)(1 − q)) > q for 1/2 < q < 1, which proves part a. for k = 3.
Part b. follows directly from part 5 of Lemma 1 and implies that part a. also
holds true for all k > 3.
Part c is is proven in Condorcet (1785: 8-9). alternative last sentence:
Part c is proven in the appendix.end of alternative10 ￿
10For other proofs of the theorem see Black (1958) and Young (1988).
7We remark that for 0 < q < 1/2, we have Qk(q) < q, Qk+2(q) < Qk(q),
and limk→∞Qk(q) = 0.11
Berend/Paroush (1998) derive suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the
theorem to hold for individuals with heterogeneous probabilities of error, but
they do not discuss diﬀerences in the probabilities of errors of diﬀerent type.
The CJT evaluates jury decisions in a very optimistic manner, as long as
an individual member’s probability of error is smaller than 0.5: In this case, a
majority decision of a jury is always better than a decision of a single member.
Moreover, the probability of a correct jury decision is strictly increasing in the
size of the body. For a body of inﬁnite size, this probability even converges
to certainty. For q < 1/2, the opposite claims are true. In the remainder of
the paper, we challenge this optimism for probabilities of error which depend
on the type of error.
3 Imperfect binary decisions
3.1 The basic decision model
Courts or juries often face a binary decision and, thus, may commit two types
of errors.12 For example, a judge may convict an innocent suspect, or acquit
a guilty suspect. There is no reason why these two types of errors should
occur with identical probabilities. In general, these probabilities of error are
independent of each other. However, this is neglected by the original CJT
and the variations we ﬁnd in the literature so far.
Consider a risk-neutral decision-maker – for example, a judge, a manager,
a prime minister, a committee, a legislative body, a people’s assembly – who
has to decide between two options, A and B, without knowing which of the
two is better. Assume that the payoﬀ generated by the options depends on
the unknown state of nature s which is either “A is better” (denoted α) or
“B is better” (denoted β). Hence, the decision-maker faces a payoﬀ structure
U(A|α) > U(B|α) and U(A|β) < U(B|β). Let π denote the prior probability
that A is the better option.
11For q ∈ {0;1/2;1}, we have limk→∞ Qk(q) = Qk+2(q) = Qk(q) = q.
12Tullock (1994), Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997).
8true state α β
better decision A B
prior π 1 − π
probability that an expert decides for A r w
probability that an expert decides for B 1 − r 1 − w
payoﬀ from decision for A G > 0 L < 0
payoﬀ from decision for B 0 0
Table 1: Parameters of Imperfect Binary Decisions
We deﬁne G as the the gain from carrying out option A if this is the better
option, hence: G = U(A|α) − U(B|α) > 0. Moreover, let L denote the loss
from carrying out A if B is the better option, thus: L = U(A|β)−U(B|β) < 0.
To make his decision, the decision-maker may either rely on his priors or
delegate the decision to one or several experts, each of whom has private and
independent information and, on the basis of this information, decides for A
with probability r ∈ [0,1] if the true state of the world is s = α and with
probability w ∈ [0,r] if the true state of the world is s = β.13 The parameters
r and w provide a measure for their decision quality: r = 1,w = 0 represents
the case of perfect experts who decide without errors, while r = w implies
the lack of ability to distinguish the two possible true states from each other.
0 < w < r < 1 models the case of experts who decide better than just blindly,
albeit not perfectly. If r = 1 − w the probability of error is independent of
the true state of the world, as in the statements of the original CJT.14 In
correspondance to Condorcet’s argument, we assume that the decision-maker
aggragates the decisions of more than one agents by simple majority.
Table 1 displays all relevant parameters of the model. The following list
summarizes the three stylized approaches how the decision-maker may decide
between A and B:
1. No jury: He can just pick one of the two options solely on the basis
13The possible incentive problem between the expert and the decision-maker is not in
the focus of this paper and, thus, is assumed to be solved.
14The assumption w ≤ r corresponds to q > 1/2 in the original CJT. One can easily
extend the argument by allowing w > r, but the exposition of the argument is more simple
with w ≤ r.
9of his priors.
2. Jury of size one: He can delegate the decision to a single expert who
determines the choice.
3. Jury of size larger than one: In the light of the CJT, he may
consider a group of k ≥ 3 of such (homogeneous) experts, i.e., a “jury”
that decides with majority.
Before we generalize the CJT in section 4, we analyze the decision-maker’s
problem if he can only decide ‘blindly’ between A and B or delegate the
decision to one single expert.
3.2 Decision without experts or a one-expert jury
Assume for the moment that the decision-maker has no experts at hand and,
therefore, has to decide “blindly” between the two options A and B. He will
carry out A if πG + (1 − π)L > 0, and pick B if πG + (1 − π)L < 0. If





allows us to simplify these three conditions as T < 1, T > 1, and T = 1,
respectively.
We extend the previous decision problem by allowing the decision-maker
to appoint one single expert instead of deciding blindly. Figure 2 depicts
the new decision problem. First, a random move (by nature N) determines
whether A (probability π) or B (1−π) is better. This is unobservable for the
decision-maker (D) who decides whether to “blindly” carry out A or B only
based on the priors, or to employ an expert who makes the correct decision
with probabilities r or 1 − w.
Delegating the decision to a single expert yields an expected payoﬀ of
rπG+w(1−π)L. This is better than carrying out the respective better option
without delegation if, and only if, rπG+w(1−π)L > max[πG + (1 − π)L,0],
or simply:15









































































The following table summarizes the optimal choice of the decision-maker
when he is restricted to “blind” decisions or one-expert juries:
decision environment optimal choice
T <
1−r
1−w “blindly” choose A
T = 1−r
1−w “blindly” choose A
or delegate decision to one-expert jury
1−r
1−w ≤ T ≤ r
w delegate decision to one-expert jury
T =
r
w “blindly” choose B
or delegate decision to one-expert jury
T > r
w “blindly” choose B
4 Imperfect binary decisions and juries
4.1 Optimal size of juries
We now consider the decision-maker’s option to employ a jury that consists



































































Figure 3: Decision among A, B, and employing an expert jury
nature decides which option is best. Then, the decision-maker either carries
out A or B blindly, or employs a jury of k members. Employing one agent is
a special case, namely k = 1, which was analyzed in the previous section.
If a jury is employed and the true state of the world were known to an
exogenous observer, the situation would be perfectly parallel to the original
jury problem of Condorcet. The probability that a majority of the jury
decides correctly is given by Qk(q) with q being replaced by r or w depending
on the true state of the world.16 Hence, if the true state of the world were s =
α, then a majority of experts would decide for A with probability Qk(r). If
the true state of the world were s = β, a majority of experts would (wrongly)
decide for A with probability Qk(w).
Hence, if the decision-maker employs a jury of k identical, imperfect ex-
perts who are characterized by quality parameters (r,w) then the expected
payoﬀ will be
Wk(r,w) ≡ Qk(r)πG + Qk(w)(1 − π)L. (4)
Note that if the two types of error were symmetric, i.e. if r = w = q and
G = L, this expression would be a constant multiple of Qk(q) in equation
(2). An extension of Lemma 1 therefore suggests itself. Before we present
16Recall that Qk( ) has been deﬁned in equation (2) above.
12the extention, we introduce a Deﬁnition for easier reference.
Deﬁnition 1 Let the set C be the combinations of r and w, for which no
error probability is larger than one half and at least one of them is smaller:
C = {(r,w) | 0 ≤ w ≤ 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1} \ ({1/2,1} × {0,1/2}).
Lemma 2 For all h ∈ I N
+ and k = 2h + 1:
1. Wk(0,0) = 0 for r = w = 0 and Wk(1,1) = πG+(1−π)L for r = w = 1,
2. Wk(r,w) is symmetric around 1/2(πG + (1 − π)L) in the sense that
Wk(1 − r,1 − w) = (πG + (1 − π)L) − Wk(r,w), which implies that


























wh−1(1 − w)h−1(1 − 2w)(1 − π)L, which implies that
Wk(r,w) is s-shaped when only one probability of error is considered,
5. Ψk+2(r,w) ≡ Wk+2(r,w)−Wk(r,w) is positive when (r,w) ∈ C, and is
negative for k → ∞ when either r > w > 1/2 or 1/2 > r > w,
6. Ψ2
k+2(r,w)≡Ψk+4(r,w)−Ψk+2(r,w) is negative when either of the fol-
lowing conditions is satisﬁed:
(a) (r,w) ∈ C
(b) Ψk+4(r,w) ≥ 0 and either r > w > 1/2 or 1/2 > r > w.
To cope with problems resulting from our assumtion that the size of a
jury is an odd number, we introduce the following
Deﬁnition 2 We say that the jury size satisfying a property is quasi-
unique if the diﬀerence of any two jury sizes satisfying the property is at
most 2.
In other words, quasi-uniqueness requires that either only one jury size sat-
isﬁes the property or one jury size and one of its direct neighbors.
With this deﬁnition, Lemma 2 has an important
13Corollary 1 The size of the jury that maximizes the expected payoﬀ as de-
ﬁnend in equation (4) is
1. inﬁnite for (r,w) ∈ C,
2. ﬁnite, quasi-unique and given by k∗(r,w) = 2max{0,⌊h∗(r,w)⌋ + 1}














and ⌊x⌋ is the largest integer smaller than, or equal to x.
Proof: Part 1 of the corollary follows immediately from part 5 of Lemma
2. Finiteness in part 2 of the corollary follows from limk→∞Ψk+2(r,w) < 0
(part 5 of Lemma 2). Quasi-uniqueness follows from parts 5 and 6 of Lemma
2: Part 5 implies that for all suﬃciently large k, the expected payoﬀ from
increasing the jury size is negative. Part 6 implies that Ψk(r,w) > 0 for all
k < k∗ when Ψk∗(r,w) ≥ 0. Hence once the jury size is small enough to let a
decline in the jury size by two members result in a non-positive change of the
expected payoﬀ, then all further declines in the jury size will strictly decrease
the expected payoﬀ. The deﬁnition of h∗(r,w) is given by the largest h for
which Ψk∗(r,w) ≥ 0 is satisﬁed (see Appendix D).
In order to easily see the relation between the error probabilities and the
optimal jury size, we take a closer look at the conditions for Ψk+2(r,w) = 0,
i.e. the conditions for Wk(r,w) being as large as Wk+2(r,w), which is shown
in Appendix C to be equivalent to:
(2r − 1)(r(1 − r)))
h+1 = T(2w − 1)(w(1 − w))
h+1 (6)
Deﬁnition 3 For T ≤ 1, let Rk(w) be the set of r ∈ (0,1) which solve equa-
tion (6) for a given value of w ∈ (0,1). Further, deﬁne r∗
k(w) = max(Rk(w)).
For T > 1, let Wk(r) be the set of w ∈ (0,1) which solve equation (6) for
a given value of r ∈ (0,1). Further, deﬁne w∗
k(r) = min(Wk(w)).
Lemma 3 For all k∗ ∈ N+ and T ≤ 1,
a. r∗
k(w) exists and is unique and continuous except for w = 1/2, where
limw↑1/2 r∗
k(w) = r∗
k(1/2) = 1/2 and limw↓1/2 r∗
k(w) = 1;
14b. limw→0r∗
k(w) = 1/2 and limw→1r∗
k(w) = 1;
c. r∗
k(w) has one minumum and no interior maximum for w ∈ (0,1/2)
and one minimum and no interior maximum for w ∈ (1/2,1);
d. r∗
k(w) increases in k when w ∈ (0,1/2) and decreases in k when w ∈
(1/2,1).
For all k∗ ∈ N+ and T > 1, w∗
k(r) has corresponding properties.
The proof follows dircetly from the previous deﬁnition. Details are given in
Appendix E.
Corollary 2 The optimal size of the jury is k∗ if and only if
r ∈ [r∗
k∗−2(w),r∗
k∗(w)] for T ≤ 1 and w ∈ (0,1/2);
r ∈ [r∗
k∗(w),r∗
k∗−2(w)] for T ≤ 1 and w ∈ (1/2,1);
w ∈ [w∗
k∗−2(r),w∗
k∗(r)] for T > 1 and r ∈ (0,1/2);
w ∈ [w∗
k∗(r),w∗
k∗−2(r)] for T > 1 and r ∈ (1/2,1).
Proof: The corollary follows from the fact that Wk(r,w) = Wk+2(r,w) on
r∗
k(w) and on w∗
k+2(r) and the fact that for T ≤ 1, h∗(r,w) increases (de-
creases) in r for w ∈ (0,1/2) (for w ∈ (1/2,1)) and for T ≥ 1, h∗(r,w)
increases (decreases) in w for r ∈ (0,1/2) (for r ∈ (1/2,1)). Hence, for ex-
ample on r∗
3(w) we have W3(r,w) = W5(r,w), i.e. a jury of three is as good
as a jury of ﬁve. If T ≤ 1 and w ∈ (0,1/2) and we slightly increase r, then
h∗(r,w) becomes larger, i.e. now we have W3(r,w) < W5(r,w). As we still
have r < r∗
5(w), it is also true that W5(r,w) > W7(r,w). Hence, ﬁve is the
optimal size of the jury.
Figure 4 depicts the optimal jury sizes for T < 1 and for T = 1; the graph
for T > 1 is symmetric to the graph for T < 1.
We have now shown that for r > w > 1/2 and for 1/2 > r > w increasing
the size of the jury is not always better. To the contrary, increasing the size
of the jury may result in a reduction of the expected payoﬀs. One can hence

























Figure 4: Optimal jury size: areas of combinations of r and w for which the
optimal size is 1, 3, 5 or inﬁnity are marked by italicized numbers; the borders
r∗
k(w) of these areas are drawn for all k ≤ 21 and for k ∈ {41,101,201}).
Left: T = 0.8, right: T = 1.
single expert. To derive an insight corresponding to part a of the original
CJT, we therefore consider the expected-payoﬀ advantage of a large jury:
Vk(r,w) ≡ Wk(r,w)−W1(r,w) = (Qk(r)−r)πG+(Qk(w)−w)(1−π)L (7)
Due to separability of Vk(r,w), we can derive the following ﬁrst important
property of this function (see ﬁgure 5 for an example):
Lemma 4 The expected-payoﬀ advantage Vk(r,w) of a jury of size k > 1
is a continuous function of r and w. This function is strictly positive for
(r,w) ∈ C and assumes the following interior extrema:
• With respect to r, the unique maximum is at r = 1/2 + Kk and the
unique minimum at r = 1/2 − Kk,
• with respect to w, the unique maximum is at w = 1/2−Kk and a unique








































Figure 5: Vk(r,w) for k = 7 and T = 0.7. w is from left to right, r from front
to back. The green plane is at Vk(r,w) = 0. The left ﬁgure plots the entire
unit square, the right ﬁgure is restricted to 0 ≤ w ≤ r ≤ 1
In order to identify the combinations of r and w for which Vk(r,w) > 0
holds true, we deﬁne a unique function ˆ rk(w) for T < 1 implicitely by:
Vk(ˆ rk(w),w) ≡ 0 ∧ ˆ rk(w) ∈ (w,1) (9)
For w ∈ (0,1/2) this function exists, is unique and continuous, has a unique
interior minimum at w = 1/2 − Kk with ˆ rk(1/2 − Kk) > 1/2 − Kk and
approaches r = 1/2 both for w → 0 and for w → 1/2. limk→∞ ˆ rk(w) = 1/2
for all w ∈ (0,1/2).
Similarly, for w ∈ (1/2,1) the function exists, is unique and continuous,
has a unique interior minimum at w = 1/2+Kk with ˆ rk(1/2+Kk) > 1/2+Kk,
and approaches r = 1 both for w → 1/2 and for w → 1. Further, for
w ∈ (1/2,1) we have ˆ rk(w) > 1 − T + wT and limk→∞ ˆ rk(w) = 1 − T + wT.
The function is undeﬁned for w ∈ {1/2,1}. These properties are proven in
Appendix G. This function as well as the two further functions to be deﬁned
in what follows are depicted in Figure 6.
For T > 1, we deﬁne a corresponding function ˆ wk(r) by
Vk(r, ˆ wk(r)) ≡ 0 ∧ ˆ wk(r) ∈ (0,r), (10)
17which has symmetric properties: For r ∈ (1/2,1) (and for r ∈ (0,1/2)) this
function exists, is unique and continuous, has a unique interior maximum
at r = 1/2 + Kk with ˆ wk(1/2 + Kk) < 1/2 + Kk (at r = 1/2 − Kk with
ˆ wk(1/2 − Kk) < 1/2 − Kk), and approaches w = 1/2 for r → 1/2 and for
r → 1 (w = 0 for r → 0 and for r → 1/2). For r ∈ (0,1/2), we have
ˆ wk(r) < r/T and limk→∞ ˆ wk(r) = r/T. The proof is also symmteric to the
proof of ˆ rk(w) and therefore omitted.
Finally, for T = 1 we deﬁne ˜ rk(w) by:
Vk(˜ rk(w),w) ≡ 0 ∧ ˜ rk(w) ∈ (w,1) (11)
This function exists only for w ∈ [0,1/2 − Kk) ∩ (1/2,1/2 + Kk), is unique,
continuous and strictly decreasing in the same interval, satisﬁes ˜ r(0) = 1/2
and approaches ˜ r(w) = 1 when w → 1/2 and ˜ r(w) = 1/2 ± Kk when w →
1/2 ± Kk, (proof in Appendix G).
With these functions, we can easily deﬁne the set of r-w-combinations for
which Vk(r,w) > 0:
Lemma 5 A jury of size k > 1 hands down better decisions than an indi-
vidual expert if and only if (r,w) ∈ C ∪ CT
1,k ∪ CT
2,k, where
for T < 1: CT
1,k = {(r,w)|w ∈ (0,1/2) ∧ r ∈ (ˆ rk(w),1/2)}
and CT
2,k = {(r,w)|w ∈ (1/2,1) ∧ r ∈ (w,ˆ rk(w))}
for T = 1: CT
1,k = {(r,w)|w ∈ (0,1/2 − Kk) ∧ r ∈ (max{w, ˜ rk(w)},1/2)}
and CT
2,k = {(r,w)|w ∈ (1/2,1/2 + Kk) ∧ r ∈ (w, ˜ rk(w))}
for T > 1: CT
1,k = {(r,w)|r ∈ (1/2,1) ∧ w ∈ (1/2, ˆ wk(r))}
and CT
2,k = {(r,w)|r ∈ (0,1/2) ∧ w ∈ ( ˆ wk(r)),w}
With respect to T = 1 we recall that ˜ rk(w) fails to exist for w ∈ (1/2 −
Kk,1/2) so that max{w,˜ rk(w)} = w in this interval. Figure 6 depicts the
sets CT
i,k with i ∈ {1,2} for k = 11. For all other k, the shape of these sets
is similar, except for k ∈ {3,5} for which ˜ rk(w) (which is only relevant for
T = 1) is convex (concave) close to w = 1/2 − Kk (close to w = 1/2 + Kk).

















































Figure 6: Jury decision (k = 11) is superior to individual decision in grey
areas. Left: T = 0.8, middle: T = 1, right: T = 1.25.
Theorem 2 (Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem) Consider a jury
that consists of k = 2h+1 members, each of whom decide in favor of option A
correctly with probability r and wrongly with probability w. The jury decides
with absolute majority. For all h ∈ I N
+:
a. Wk(r,w) > W1(r,w) if and only if (r,w) ∈ C ∪ CT
1,k ∪ CT
2,k.
b. Wk+2(r,w) > Wk(r,w) if (r,w) ∈ C or k < 2h∗(r,w) + 1;
Wk+2(r,w) < Wk(r,w) if (r,w) / ∈ C and k > 2h∗(r,w) + 1
c. The limit of Wk(r,w) for k → ∞ depends on r, w, and T:
(i) if (r,w) ∈ C
then limk→∞Wk(r,w) > W¯ k(r,w) for all ¯ k < ∞ ;
(ii) if 1 − (1 − w)T > r ≥ w > 1/2 or 1/2 > r ≥ w > r/T
then limk→∞Wk(r,w) ∈ (W1(r,w),Wk∗(r,w));
(iii) if 1/2 > r ≥ max(w,wT) or 1/2 < w ≤ min(r,1 − (1 − r)/T)
then limk→∞Wk(r,w) < W¯ k(r,w) for all ¯ k < ∞.
For better intuition of part c. of the theorem and its proof, we mark
the three cases in ﬁgure 7 for T S 1. One should note that case (ii), i.e.
limk→∞Wk(r,w) ∈ (W1(r,w),Wk∗(r,w)) occurs only for r ≥ w > 1/2 (for
1/2 > r ≥ w) if T < 1 (if T > 1) and not at all if T = 1, since at least one
of the inequalities deﬁning this case is violated in each case.




































































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1/T
T >1
Figure 7: Three cases of part c. of Theorem 2 for T S 1 (only solid lines
separate areas).
To prove Part c. we ﬁrst note that the jury of inﬁnite size hands down
perfect decisions if (r,w) ∈ C (case (i)) because then limk→∞ Qk(r) = 1
and limk→∞Qk(w) = 0. For r ≥ w > 1/2 and 1/2 > r ≥ w we note that
due to the convergence properties of ˆ rk(w) and ˆ wk(r) the set CT
1,k (Lemma
5) converges to the empty set for k → ∞ and CT
2,k converges to the set
deﬁned by the conditions of case (ii). Hence limk→∞ Wk(r,w) > W1(r,w)
in case (ii) and limk→∞Wk(r,w) < W1(r,w) in case (iii). Quasi-uniqueness
of k∗ implies limk→∞Wk(r,w) < W¯ k(r,w) for all ¯ k ≥ k∗ and W1(r,w) <
W¯ k(r,w) < Wk∗(r,w) for all ¯ k ∈ (1,k∗). Hence in case (ii) we have W1(r,w) <
limk→∞Wk(r,w) < Wk∗(r,w) and in case (iii) we have limk→∞Wk(r,w) <
W1(r,w) < W¯ k(r,w).
If we compare Theorem 2 to Theorem 1 it becomes obvious that the results
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem carry over to all cases in which no error
probability is larger than one half and at least one of them diﬀers from both
zero and one half ((r,w) ∈ C). However, if one probability of error is larger
than one half, none of the claims of the Condorcet Jury Theorem is valid any
more: juries need not render better decisions than individuals, increasing
the jury size reduces the decision quality if the jury becomes large enough
since the optimal jury size is ﬁnite. Even worse, for most combinations of
error probabilities, the decisions of a jury of inﬁnite size are worse than the
decisions of any smaller jury.
205 Solution of complete decision problem
In the previous two sections, we have compared the “blind” decision to the
decision of one expert and the decisions of juries of various sizes. What is
still open is the comparison of the decisons of a jury larger than one member
and the “blind” decision based solely on the priors. We ﬁrst compare the
jury of a given size to the blind decision and then contrast the decisions
of juries of optimal size to the “blind” decision. To abbreviate, we write
Wo ≡ max(0,πG + (1 − π)L) for the expected payoﬀ of the optimal “blind”
decision.
For juries of a given size, we start with the most simple case: T = 1.
Then the “blind” decision yields an expected payoﬀ of zero (independently
of whether A or B is chosen). The decision of a jury of uninformed experts
(r = w) induces the same expected payoﬀ due to
Wk(r,r) = Qk(r)πG + Qk(r)(1 − π)L = Qk(r)(πG + (1 − π)L) = 0. (12)
Since
∂Wk(r,w)
∂r > 0 (Lemma 2, part 3), Wk(r,w) > Wo = 0 for all r > w.
For T < 1, the optimal “blind” decision is A and thus Wo = πG + (1 −
π)L > 0. The expected payoﬀ from a decision of a jury of uninformed experts
(r = w) is smaller than the payoﬀ from the optimal “blind” decision, except
for the limiting case of r = w = 1, when the jury “blindly” decides for A:
Wk(r,r) = Qk(r)πG+Qk(r)(1−π)L = Qk(r)(πG+(1−π)L) ≤ πG+(1−π)L
with equality only for r = 1. On the other hand, with r = 1 > w a jury
induces a higher expected payoﬀ than the “blind” decision:
Wk(1,w) = Qk(1)πG+Qk(w)(1−π)L = πG+Qk(w)(1−π)L > πG+(1−π)L
due to L < 0. Hence,
∂Wk(r,w)
∂r > 0 (again Lemma 2, part 3) implies that
there is a unique function ro




k(w),w) T Wo ⇔ r T r
o
k(w)
By symmetry, we can deﬁne a corresponding function wo
T(r) for T > 1:
Wk(r,w
o
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Figure 8: Properties of ro
k(w).
Obviously, ro
k(w) = 1 − T + wT and wo
k(r) = r/T.






k(0)S1/2 ⇔ TT1/2, limw→1ro
k(w)=1,
ro
k(w) < min(1 − T + wT,r∗
k(w)) for w ∈ (1/2,1), limk→∞ ro
k(w) = 1/2 for
w ∈ [0,1/2] and limk→∞ ro
k(w) = w for w ∈ (1/2,1).
dwo
k(r)
dr > 0, wo
k(1) ∈ (0,1), wo




k(r)) for r ∈ (0,1/2), limk→∞ wo
k(r) = 1/2 for
r ∈ [1/2,1] and limk→∞ wo
k(r) = r for r ∈ (0,1/2).
The proof is given in Appendix I. Figure 8 shows ro
k(w) for T = 0.4 and
for T = 0.7 and k ∈ {1,3,5,39}. For better reference, the ﬁgure also shows
r∗
k(w). The graphs for T > 1 are symmetric. The properties of ro
k(w) become
clear in the ﬁgure: The function increases in w, starts from some value in
the interval (0,1/2) if T > 1/2 and from some value in the interval (1/2,1)
if T < 1/2, and eventually approaches one as w grows towards one. For
w > 1/2, the value of ro
k(w) is stricly below both the line delimiting the
range for which the “blind” decision is better than the individual expert’s
decision (1 − T + wT) and the curve above which k is the optimal jury size
(r∗
k+2(w)).
The lemma has two iportant implications:
Corollary 3 The decision of an optimally-sized jury may only be worse than
22the “blind” decision, if its bias is in the opposite direction of the payoﬀ-
weighted priors (i.e. if 1/2 > r > w despite T < 1 or r > w > 1/2 despite
T > 1) or it consists of ignorant experts (r = w).
If k → ∞ the jury decision is worse than the “blind” decision, if its bias is
in the opposite direction of the payoﬀ-weighted priors or it consits of ignorant
experts (r = w). Otherwise, its decisions are better than the “blind” decision.
With this background, it is easy to compare the decision of juries of op-
timal size to the “blind” decision:











In words, the “blind” decision is better than the decision of a jury of
optimal size if and only if either the jury consists of ignorant members (r =
w) or its bias is so much in the opposite direction of the payoﬀ-weighted
priors that r is smaller than the lower hull of all ro
k(w) (for T < 1) or w
is larger than the upper hull of all wo
k(r). The careful reader will realize
that for T / ∈ (1/2,2), this is the case whenever the jury’s bias is in the
opposite direction of the payoﬀ-weighted priors (1/2 > r ≥ w and T < 1 or
r ≥ w > 1/2 and T > 1). Otherwise the “blind” decision is worse than the
decision of a jury of optimal size. If T = 1, the “blind” decision is better than
the decision of a jury of optimal size only if the jury members are completely
uninformed (r = w). Figure 9 adds the insights of Theorem 3 to Figure 4:
In the area labeled “0” the blind decision is better than the decison of a jury
of optimal size.
6 Results and discussion
Judges and juries have to make binary decisions and, therefore, may commit
two types of errors, the probabilities of which are independent of each other.
This fact is not taken into account in the original Condorcet Jury Theorem
nor in the ensuing literature. Acknowledging this independence, however,
makes a more complex deﬁnition of “decision quality” inevitable. We have


























Figure 9: Optimal jury size: areas of combinations of r and w for which the
optimal size is 1, 3, 5 or inﬁnity are marked by italicized numbers; the borders
r∗
k(w) of these areas are drawn for all k ≤ 21 and for k ∈ {41,101,201}). The
area of combinations of r and w for which it is best to rely on the optimal
“blind” decision is marked by “0”.
selecting one alternative rather than the other. This allowed us to compare
the qualities of decisions based on prior information (“blind” decisions), on
the information of one expert, and on the majority vote of a number of alike
experts. This comparison entails a generalized version of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem for probabilities of error not adding up to one. In addition, we
derived an extension which adds the comparison with the “blind” decision
to the Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem.
The Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem implies that none of the three
claims of the original Condercet Jury Theorem holds true for all juries of
equally informed experts. Even if the jury members are all informed (each
of them is more likely to vote for an alternative if it is the better choice than
if it is the worse choice) a jury of more than one member not necessarily
decides better than an individual expert (a jury of size one), larger juries are
not necessarily better than smaller juries, and the optimal jury size may be
ﬁnite. Our extension implies that even decisions of juries of the optimal size
need not be better than “blind” decisions, i.e. decisions based solely on the
prior probabilities of the states of the world.
Just as the original CJT, the generalized theorem works with rather
24strict assumptions. Some of them (homogeneous jury members, indepen-
dent decision-making) have been dealt with in the literature on the original
CJT. We conjecture that the insights of this branch of literature transfers
– mutatis mutandis – to our setting. Nevertheless, further research will be
valuable in combining the variations dealt with in that literature with our
extension.
Biased information of jury members as we allow for may open the possi-
bility of juries to improve their decision quality by giving up some of their
information. Two ways to do so suggest themselves. One would be to ignore
the votes of some jury members if a jury is too large. The other would be
that each member neglects his information with some positive probability
and simply votes for one predetermined alternative. That this latter neglect
of information may improve the decision becomes obvious if one considers a
jury of large ﬁnite size with r and w such that the optimal jury size would
be one and the jury’s decision is worse than the “blind” decision.17 If the
jury members with these probabilities gave up some of their information by
sometimes blindly voting for A, they could reach any combination of r and
w which is on the straight line between their original r-w-combination and
the point r = w = 1. Obviously some of these r-w-combinations induce jury
decisions which are better than the “blind” decision. Details of the condi-
tions under which such improving decision quality by neglecting information
have to be left for further research.
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A Proof of Lemma 1























































For an alternative proof of part 3 see e.g. Boland (1989) referring to Mood
(1950: 253).
Part 4 follows immediately from part 3, with s-shapedness following from
d2Qk(q)
dq2 T 0 ⇔ q S 1/2.
To prove part 5, we can either simply refer to Condorcet (1785: 5) or
present a similar, but perhaps slightly more comprehensible proof: We ﬁrst
rewrite Qk(q) = qQk(q) + (1 − q)Qk(q), shift the index of the ﬁrst sum,













































































































































































































































































































(Condorcet, 1785: 5). Obviously, ∆k+2(q) > 0 for all 1/2 < p < 1 and all
k = 2h + 1, which completes the proof of part 5.



























< due to q(1−q) ≤ 1
4 and k+2
k+3 < 1,
which completes the proof.
B Proof of Part c. of Theorem 1
The proof of Part c. follows Condorcet (1785: 8-9): We ﬁrst expand the re-
cursive deﬁnition of Qk(q) from as equation (23) as a sum and then make use
of the Taylor expansion of (1 − 4q(1 − q))
−1/2 to eliminate the summation
term, which allows us to determine limk→∞ Qk(q).
From equation (23) we get
Q2h+1(q) = q +
h−1 X
ℓ=0










for h ≥ 1. Hence
lim
k→∞










Consider the following transformation of the Taylor expansion of f(z) =
(1 − 4z)
−1/2:































































(2ℓ + 1)!2(ℓ + 1)













Note that if we replace z = q(1 − q), the last term in equation (26) is the
same as the last term in equation (25). We can thus rewrite the latter as:
lim
k→∞




−1 + (1 − 4q(1 − q))
−1/2
￿








1 − 4q + 4q2 = 1,
which completes the proof.
31C Proof of Lemma 2
Part 1 is obvious when we insert part a. of Theorem 1 into equation (4). Parts
2 through 4 may easily be derived in a similar way from parts 2 through 4
of Lemma 1 and equation (4).
To prove part 5 we note that
Ψk+2(r,w) ≡ Wk+2(r,w) − Wk(r,w)
=Qk+2(r)πG + Qk+2(w)(1 − π)L −
￿























where the last equality makes use of part 5 of Lemma 1. For (r,w) ∈ C, the
two terms in brackets in the last line are non-negative due to L < 0 and at
least one of them is strictly positive.
















πG + (2w − 1)(1 − π)L
#
,
which for h → ∞ is negative as all terms outside the brackets are positive,
the fraction inside the brackets is smaller than one and thus the entire term
in brackets reduces to (2w − 1)(1 − π)L < 0.



















which for h → ∞ is negative as all terms outside the brackets are positive,
the fraction inside the brackets is smaller than one and thus the entire term
in brackets reduces to (2r − 1)πG < 0.














+(2w − 1)(w(1 − w))










of which the ﬁrst term is negative for r ∈ (1/2,1) and the second for w ∈
(0,1/2) since both terms in brackets are negative due to 4k+2
k+3 < 4 < 1
q(1−q)
32for q ∈ {r,w} and their respective co-factors are both positive. For r ∈
{1/2,1} and for w ∈ {0,1/2} the respective terms are zero. Hence, for
0 ≤ w ≤ 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1 we have Ψ2
k+2(r,w) ≤ 0 with equality only for
(r,w) ∈ {1/2,1} × {0,1/2}.
For r > w > 1/2 and for 1/2 > r > w we note that by the proof of part
5 of this lemma Ψk+4(r,w) > 0 implies:
(2w − 1)(w(1 − w))
h+2 (1 − π)L ≥ −(2r − 1)(r(1 − r))
h+2 πG
Recalling that in equation (27) the terms in brackets are negative, this yields:
Ψ
2

































πG[r(1 − r) − w(1 − w)] (28)
For r > w > 1/2 the last factor in line (28) is negative and the other factors
are positive, while for 1/2 > r > w ﬁrst factor is negative and the other
factors are positive. Hence, the entire term in line (28) is negative in both
cases which implies Ψ2
k+2(r,w) < 0 and thus completes the proof.
D Proof of the deﬁnition of k∗ in Corollary 1
Ψk(r,w) ≥ 0 implies
(2w − 1)(w(1 − w))
h (1 − π)L ≥ −(2r − 1)(r(1 − r))
h πG








with a reversed greater sign for 1/2 > r > w. We note that the left-hand side













33again with a reversed greater sign for 1/2 > r > w. Dividing by the logarithm



















(positive) for r > w > 1/2 (for 1/2 > r > w). Due to parts 5 and 6 of
Lemma 2 h maximizes the expected payoﬀs when it is the largest h which


















where ⌊x⌋ is the largest integer smaller than x. Note that if the fraction
of logarithms happens to be an integer h+, then Ψ2h++1(r,w) = 0, i.e.
W2h+−1(r,w) = W2h++1(r,w) > Wk(r,w) for all k / ∈ {2h+ − 1,2h+ + 1}.
Our deﬁnition of ⌊x⌋ selects the smaller of such two equally good jury sizes.
Also note that the max operator accounts for the restriction of jury sizes
to the positive odd natural numbers.
E Proof of Lemma 3
To prove the properties of r∗
k(w) consider the function
g(x) ≡ (2x − 1)(x(1 − x))
h+1,
which is equal to the left-hand side of equation (6) if x = r and equal to the
right-hand side of equation (6) divided by T if x = w. It is easy to see that
g(x) has the following properties (cf. Figure 10):
g(0) = g(1/2) = g(1) = 0 (31)
g(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1/2); g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ (1/2,1) (32)
g′(x) ≡
dg(x)
dx = −(x(1 − x))h [2(3 + 2h)x2 − 2(3 + 2h)x + (h + 1)] (33)











g′(x) > 0 if x ∈ (xmin,xmax); g′(x) < 0 if x ∈ (0,xmin)) ∪ (xmax,1)(35)









For the moment, we assume T < 1. To prove existence and uniqueness of
r∗
k(w) for w ∈ (0,1), we ﬁrst note that g(x) = y has two solutions xs(y) ∈














Figure 10: Properties of the function g(x). x1 and x2 are arbitrary.
are thus also two solutions in r to g(r) = Tg(w). Because for r = w ∈
(0,1)\{1/2} we have |g(r) − Tg(w)| > 0, one of these solutions is smaller
than w and the other is larger (see x1 and x2 as examples in Figure 10).
Hence, for w ∈ (0,1)\{1/2}, r∗
k(w) ∈ (0,1) exists and is unique. We note
that for w ∈ (0,1/2) we have r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmin,1/2) and for w ∈ (1/2,1) we
have r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmax,1). Since Tg(1/2) = 0 and due to properties (31) and
(32), r = 0, r = 1/2 and r = 1 are the only solutions to g(r) = Tg(1/2). The
deﬁnition of r∗
k(w) excludes r = 0 and r = 1 and thus r∗
k(1/2) = 1/2 exists
and is unique.
Continuity for w  = 1/2 and the discontinuity at w = 1/2 are obvious
from the previous argument and Figure 10. Together with properties (31)
and (32) this implies that limw→0r∗
k(w) = 1/2 and limw→1r∗
k(w) = 1. This
completes the proof of parts a. and b.
To prove part c, we ﬁrst concentrate on w ∈ (0,1/2]. We know that in this
range r∗
k(w) is continuous. By the Implicit Function Theorem and properties






k(w)) = 0 if and only if w = xmin. Due
to r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmin,1/2), we know that g′(r∗
k(w)) > 0 for all w ∈ (0,1/2).












k(w)) > 0 for w >
xmin if w ≈ xmin. Hence, the extremum at w = xmin must be a minimum.
Uniqueness of xmin implies that this minimum is the unique interior extremum
for w ∈ (0,1/2]. The argument for w ∈ (1/2,1) runs accordingly, after noting
that in this range g′(w) T 0 if and only if w S xmax and g′(r∗
k(w)) < 0 for all
r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmax,1/2).
For the proof of part d. we note that an increase in k entails an increase of
both sides of equation (6), but the increase of the left-hand side is stronger
(weaker) when 1/2 > r∗
k(w) > w (when r∗
k(w) > w > 1/2). Keeping w
constant thus requires to reduce (increase) the left-hand side of equation (6).
Due to r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmin,1/2) if 1/2 > r∗
k(w) > w and r∗
k(w) ∈ (xmax,1) if
35r∗
k(w) > w > 1/2, the left-hand side of equation (6) increases (decreases) in
r∗
k(w) if 1/2 > r∗
k(w) > w (if r∗
k(w) > w > 1/2). Thus equation (6) may
only remain satisﬁed after an increase in k, if r∗
k(w) increases if w ∈ (0,1/2)
and decreases if w ∈ (1/2,1), which completes the proof of the properties of
r∗
k(w).
The proof of the properties of w∗
k(r) for T > 1 is symmetric and therefore
omitted.
For T = 1, g(r) = Tg(w) has always two solutions and r = w is always
one of them, except for w = xmin or w = xmax, where the two solutions
coincide on r = w. Again making use of the Implicit Function Theorem it is
easy to see that the solution satisfying r  = w declines in w due to the fact
that for 1/2 > w it satisﬁes either r > xmin > w or r < xmin < w and for
w > 1/2 the same is true with xmax replacing xmin. Hence if w ∈ (0,xmin) or
w ∈ (1/2,xmax), r∗
k(w) > w declines in w; if w = xmin or w = xmax, r∗
k(w)
reaches its minimum; ﬁnally, if w ∈ (xmin,1/2) or w ∈ (xmax),1, r∗
k(w) = w
increases in w. The remainder of the argument follows the lines of the case
T < 1.
F Proof of Lemma 4
Continuity follows from the fact that ˜ V (r,w) is a diﬀerence of a polynomial
in r and a polynomial in w. For (r,w) ∈ C we know that Qk(r) − r ≥ 0 ≥
Qk(w) − w with at least one strict inequality which implies that both terms
in the deﬁnition of Vk(r,w) (equation 7) are non-negative and at least one is
strictly positive which proves Vk(r,w) > 0.



















wh(1 − w)h − 1
￿
(1−π)L. Equating the two derivatives
to zero and solving for r and w, respectively, yields the extrema at the levels
of r and w given in the Lemma. From part 4 of Lemma 2 we get the second
derivatives and immediately see that the extrema are maxima and minima






, one should ﬁrst note
that K3 = 1/
√















which we prove by induction: It is easy to see that for h = 1, both sides are













































geometric mean. Increasing h by 1 adds another factor which is smaller than
all previous factors and thus lowers the geometric mean. As a consequence,






approaches 4, because the additional factors and hence the geometric mean
of all factors becomes ever closer to 4. Thus Kk approaches zero.
G Proof of Properties of ˆ rk(w) and of ˜ rk(w)
G.1 ˆ rk(w)
To prove existence and uniqueness, we ﬁrst note that for w = 0, Vk(r,0) =
(Qk(r) − r)πG is strictly negative (strictly positive) for r ∈ (0,1/2) (for
r ∈ (1/2,1)) by Part 2 of Lemma 1 and Part a of Theorem 1. Only for
r = 1/2 we have Vk(r,0) = (Qk(r) − r)πG = 0.
Again referring to Part 2 of Lemma 1 and Part a of Theorem 1, for
w ∈ (0,1/2) we know that Vk(w,w) = (Qk(w)−w)πG+(Qk(w)−w)(1−π)L =
(Qk(w)−w)πG(1−T) < 0 while Vk(r,w) > 0 for all r ∈ [1/2,1] by Lemma 4.
Then Vk(r,w) must be zero exactly once for r ∈ (max{w,1/2−Kk},1/2) and
never for w < r < 1/2−Kk, since Vk(r,w) increases only in the entire interval
r ∈ (1/2 − Kk,1/2 + Kk) and is continuous (Lemma 4). The convergence
property limk→∞ ˆ rk(w) = 1/2 for all w ∈ (0,1/2) follows from limk→∞Kk =
1/2 (Proof of Lemma 4).
Finally, for w ∈ (1/2,1), we know that Vk(w,w) = (Qk(w) − w)πG(1 −
T) > 0 and Vk(1,w) = (Qk(w)−w)(1−π)L < 0. Since by Lemma 4 Vk(r,w)
is continuous and for r ∈ (w,1] ⊂ (1/2,1] decreases in r only in the entire
interval r ∈ (1/2 + Kk,1], the solution of Vk(r,w) = 0 must again exist, be
unique and satisfy r > 1/2 + Kk, which completes the proof of existence,
uniqueness and the range of ˆ r(w).
Given existence and uniqueness for the entire domain of deﬁnition, conti-
nuity of Vk(r,w) implies continuity of ˆ rk(w). To prove existence and unique-
ness of the minima, we consider the ﬁrst derivative of ˆ rk(w), which by the


















rh(1 − r)h − 1
(37)
We know from the proof of existence and uniqueness of the function that
∂Vk
∂r is strictly positive (strictly negative) at ˆ rk(w) when w < 1/2 (when
w > 1/2). From Lemma 4 we know that
∂Vk
∂w = 0 only at w = 1/2 ± Kk.
Lemma 4 also implies that
∂Vk
∂w is negative only for w ∈ (1/2−Kk,1/2+Kk)
and positive for w / ∈ [1/2−Kk,1/2+Kk]. Given the sign of
∂Vk
∂r , this implies
that ˆ rk(w) declines for w ∈ [0,1/2−Kk) and for w ∈ (1/2,1/2+Kk), reaches
37its minima at w = 1/2±Kk and increases again for w ∈ (1/2−Kk,1/2) and
for w ∈ (1/2+Kk,1), which completes the proof of existence and uniqueness
of the minima.
To prove the claims on the limits, we ﬁrst concentrate on w → 0 and
extend the argument for the other three cases by analogy. We note that
Vk(1/2,0) = 0, Vk(r,0) < 0 for r ∈ (0,1/2), and Vk(1/2,w) > 0 for
w ∈ (0,1/2). By continuity, this implies that in every small neighborhood
of (r,w) = (0,1/2) there must be some pairs (r,w) ∈ (0,1/2) × (0,1/2)
for which Vk(r,w) = 0. As this is true for every arbitrarily small neighbor-
hood, uniqueness of ˆ rk(w) implies that limw→0 = 1/2. By analogy, the same
argument holds true for the other limits of w.
Finally, for w ∈ (1/2,1) if the derivative of ˆ rk(w) is positive, it is also
smaller than T because the denominator of the right-hand side of equation
37 is strictly negative and the numerator is either positive, which implies that
dˆ rk(w)









rh(1−r)h−1 so that the fraction is smaller than
one. Noting that r = 1 − T + wT is the straight line through (w,r) = (1,1)
with slope T, it is obvious that with
dˆ rk(w)
dw < T and limw→1 = 1 the function
ˆ rk(w) must always be larger than the function r = 1 − T + wT in the entire
neighborhood of (w,r) = (1,1) for which ˆ rk(w) is continuous, i.e. for w ∈













rh(1 − r)h → 0 so
that limk→∞
dˆ rk(w)
dw = T for all w ∈ (1/2,1). Thus limk→∞ ˆ rk(w) = 1−T +wT
for all w ∈ (1/2,1).
G.2 ˜ rk(w)
To prove existence and uniqueness we ﬁrst note that due to T = 1, we have
Vk(w,w) = (Qk(w) − w)πG(1 − T) = 0. Given the extrema of Vk(r,w) with
respect to r as stated in Lemma 4, Vk(r,w) is strictly increasing in r for all
r ∈ (1/2 − Kk,1/2 + Kk) and decreasing for all r / ∈ [1/2 − Kk,1/2 + Kk].
Then the facts that Vk(r,w) > 0 for all (r,w) ∈ C and Vk(w,w) = 0 imply
that Vk(r,w) = 0 has a unique solution for w ∈ [0,1/2−Kk) and no solution
for w ∈ [1/2 − Kk,1/2]. Obviously, the solution must be in the interval
r ∈ (1/2 − Kk,1/2). Similarly, the facts that for w ∈ (1/2,1), Vk(1,w) < 0
and Vk(w,w) = 0 imply that Vk(r,w) = 0 has a unique solution for w ∈
[1/2,1/2 + Kk) and no solution for w ∈ [1/2 + Kk,1]. Now the solution has
to be in the interval (1/2 + Kk,1).
Given existence and uniqueness of ˜ rk(w), continuity of Vk(r,w) implies
continuity of ˜ rk(w). By the implicit function Theorem, the ﬁrst derivative of
˜ rk(w) is given by the same expression as the ﬁrst derivative of ˆ rk(w) (equation
37). Due to the slopes of Vk(r,w) implicit in Lemma 4 this expression is
negative for w ∈ [0,1/2 − Kk) and for w ∈ (1/2,1/2 + Kk).
The limits for the boundaries of the two deﬁnition intervals may be derived
38in a parallel way as for ˆ rk(w). The details are therefore omitted here.
H Proof of Lemma 5
The claim that a jury of size k > 1 hands down better decisions than an
individual expert is equivalent to Vk(r,w) > 0. For (r,w) ∈ C, the lemma
restates the ﬁrst insight of Lemma 4. For T < 1 and (r,w) / ∈ C we know
from the proof of the properties of ˆ r(w) in Appendix G that Vk(r,w) = 0
only at r = ˆ r(w) and that
∂Vk
∂r > 0 at r = ˆ r(w) < 1/2 and
∂Vk
∂r < 0 at
r = ˆ r(w) > 1/2 which implies that Vk(r,w) > 0 only in the regions stated
in the lemma. The corresponding result for T > 1 follows by symmetry.
For T = 1 and (r,w) / ∈ C the proof of the properties of ˜ r(w) in Appendix G
implies that for w ∈ [0,1/2−Kk) we have Vk(r,w) > 0 if and only if r > ˜ r(w)
while for w ∈ (1/2,1/2 + Kk) we have Vk(r,w) > 0 if and only if r < ˜ r(w).
We have also seen there, that for w ∈ [1/2 − Kk,1/2) we have Vk(r,w) > 0
for all r > w while for w ∈ [1/2 + Kk,1) we never have Vk(r,w) > 0. This
completes the proof.
I Proof of Lemma 6
We concentrate on the properties of ro
k(w) and leave the properties of wo
k(r)
to a symmetry argument.
ro
k(w) is deﬁned by Wk(ro
k(w),w) = Wo, which for T < 1 reduces to
Wk(r
o
k(w),w) = πG + (1 − π)L (38)



























T > 0, (39)
where the second equality follows from part 3. of Lemma 2.
Writing Wk(ro
k(w),0) = Qk(ro
k(w))πG + Qk(0)(1 − π)L = Qk(ro
k(w))πG
implies that ro
k(0) is deﬁned by Qk(ro
k(0))πG = πG+(1−π)L which reduces
to Qk(ro
k(0)) = 1−T. Since 1−T ∈ (0,1), we have Qk(ro
k(0)) ∈ (0,1) which
entails ro
k(0) ∈ (0,1).
In addition, T T 1/2 implies 1−T S 1/2 and thus Qk(ro
k(0)) S 1/2 which
entails ro
k(0) S 1/2 by Lemma 1.
If we extend the domain of ro
k(w) to include w = 1,18 equation (38) implies
Wk(ro
k(1),1) = Qk(ro
k(1))πG + Qk(1)(1 − π)L = Qk(ro
k(1))πG + (1 − π)L =
18We restricted the domain of ro
k(w) to w ∈ [0,1] in the original deﬁnition, because our
restriction of the domain of our analysis to 1 ≥ r ≥ w implies r = 1 for w = 1 and thus
does not leave any place for consideration on r being larger or smaller than any value for
w = 1.
39πG+(1−π)L which implies Qk(ro
k(1)) = 1 and thus ro
k(1) = 1. Since ro
k(w) as
deﬁned by equation (38) is continuous for w ∈ [0,1], we get limw→1ro
k(w) = 1.








T > T for w ∈ (1/2,1).
Hence whenever the lines ro
k(w) and 1−T +wT intersect when w ∈ (1/2,1),
the slope of ro
k(w) is larger than the slope of 1−T +wT. Since at w = 1 we
have ro
k(w) = 1−T +wT = 1, we get ro
k(w) < 1−T +wT for all w ∈ (1/2,1).
Similarly, the slope of r∗




















￿h 2(3 + 2h)w(1 − w) − (h + 1)
2(3 + 2h)r∗
k(w)(1 − r∗
k(w)) − (h + 1)
If this derivative is positive for w > 1/2, then the numerator and the de-
nominator in the ﬁrst line are negative (recall property (35) of g′(x)), and
thus the signs of the numerator and the denominator of the last fraction
in the second line are negative too. Hence r∗
k(w) > w > 1/2 implies
w(1 − w) > r∗
k(w)(1 − r∗
k(w)) and 0 > 2(3 + 2h)w(1 − w) − (h + 1) >
2(3 + 2h)r∗
k(w)(1 − r∗

















Obviously, the same holds true, when
dr∗
k(w)
dw < 0. Hence whenever the lines
ro
k(w) and r∗
k(w) intersect when w ∈ (1/2,1), the slope of ro
k(w) is larger
than the slope of r∗
k(w). Since at w = 1 we have ro
k(w) = r∗
k(w) = 1, we
get ro
k(w) < r∗
k(w) for all w ∈ (1/2,1). Combining the insights from this
paragraph, we get ro
k(w) < min(1 − T + wT,r∗
k(w)) for w ∈ (1/2,1).





Qk(r)πG + Qk(w)(1 − π)L =
￿
πG if r > 1/2
0 if r < 1/2
Hence, for any given r, we have limk→∞Wk(r,w)  = Wo. Only if ro
k(w)
approaches 1/2 fast enough, as k grows to inﬁnity, limk→∞Wk(ro
k(w),w) =
Wo is possible. Hence, limk→∞ro
k(w) = 1/2.

















dw = T < 1. Since due to ro
k(1) = 1 the slope
dro
k(w)
dw > 1 would
violate ro
k(w) > w, r has to approach w as k → ∞.
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